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Abstract
We model comparative advertising as brands pushing up own brand perception and
pulling down the brand image of targeted rivals. We watched all TV advertisements
for OTC analgesics 2001-2005 to construct matrices of rival targeting and estimate the
structural model. These attack matrices identify diversion ratios and hence compar-
ative advertising damage measures. We nd that outgoing comparative advertising
attacks are half as powerful as self-promotion in raising own perceived quality and
cause more damage to the targeted rival than benet to the advertiser. Compara-
tive advertising causes most damage through the pull-down e¤ect and has substantial
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1 Introduction
Comparative advertising targets a specic rival. This unique feature enables us to use sup-
ply side (advertising) decisions to nd demand-side relations in the form of diversion ratios.
This would not be possible with purely self-promotional advertising or equilibrium pricing
relations that conate all e¤ects into a single variable (advertising or price). Comparative
advertising can directly harm the brand that is targeted as well as help the brand that is
advertised. It can also benet rivals that are not targeted, due to the adverse impact on
the target. These distinctive properties of comparative advertising set it apart from self-
promoting advertising and underscore the importance of breaking down advertising expen-
ditures by the target of comparative advertisements, instead of simply analyzing aggregate
advertising expenditures.
Comparative advertising pushes up own brand perception along with pulling down the
brand image of the targeted rival. Investigating the magnitudes of these e¤ects is critical to
understanding rmsadvertising choices. We propose a model of rival targeting to determine
brandsself-promotion and comparative advertising choices. We use a novel dataset from
the Over-The-Counter (OTC) analgesics industry in the United States to estimate the model
and the diversion ratios between brands. We then nd how prots of targeted brands are
a¤ected by comparative advertising, and the comparative advertising spillovers onto other
(non-targeted) rivals.
Our push-pull model is based on a discrete choice approach to demand, in which brands
perceived qualities are shifted by advertising.1 The way in which advertising enters the model
is most simply thought of as persuasive advertising that shifts demand up.2 Promoting
ones own product increases demand directly, whether through self-promotion advertising
or comparative advertising, while denigrating a rival helps a brand indirectly by decreasing
perceived quality of a rival.3 By hurting the rival product, some consumers are diverted, and
1The Pushmi-Pullyu is a ctitious two-headed llama befriended by Dr Doolittle. The heads are pointed
in di¤erent directions. When one pushes forward, it pulls the other end back from its preferred direction.
2This is consistent with hype in the Johnson and Myatt (2006) taxonomy of demand shifts and with
complementary advertising of the type propounded by Stigler-Becker (1977) and Becker and Murphy (1993).
3A somewhat similar approach is expounded in Harrington and Hess (1996). These authors treat positive
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the comparative advertiser succeeds in attracting some portion of those consumers.
The model furnishes the advertising rst order conditions that predict oligopoly equilib-
rium relationships between advertising levels (for di¤erent types of advertising) and market
shares. Equilibrium pricing conditions eliminate prices from the relation between di¤erent
ad types and other observable market variables, like market shares.4
Our approach is broadly consistent with advertising as a demand shifter (as in Dixit
and Norman, 1978) and the complementary view of Stigler and Becker (1977) and Becker
and Murphy (1993) (see Bagwell, 2007, for a comprehensive survey of the literature on
advertising). The theoretical economics literature on comparative advertising is quite scarce.
Anderson and Renault (2009) model it as directly informative revelation of horizontal match
characteristics of products.5 Barigozzi, Garella, and Peitz (2009) and Emons and Fluet
(2011) apply the signaling model of advertising (which goes back to insights in Nelson, 1974,
and was formalized in Kihlstrom and Riordan, 1984, and Milgrom and Roberts, 1986). Our
theory engages the complementary view with the added element of pulling down the rival.
Our approach stands apart from previous empirical analysis of advertising in that, due to
our content data, we break down the ad expenditures into comparative and self-promotion
expenditures, and the comparative expenditures are further broken down into attacker-target
pairs. This contrasts with previous papers that have typically used total ad expenditures
as the sole advertising variable (see e.g. Nevo, 2000 and 2001, and Sovinsky Goeree, 2008).
Many previous studies on advertising have considered a dynamic setting where current ad-
vertising a¤ects future demand (Roberts and Samuelson, 1988, Erdem and Keane, 1996,
Ackerberg, 2001 and 2003, Hendel and Nevo, 2006, Gowrisankaran and Rysman, 2009, and
Dubé, Hitsch and Manchanda, 2005). This literature for the most part relinquishes analyz-
and negative advertising by 2 politicians with given locations in a policy space. Negative advertising shifts
a rival candidate away from the median voter, while positive advertising shifts a candidate closer. This
framework would provide an interesting base to develop a product market model.
4Firms with a lot of advertising are typically those with large market shares. They also tend to set high
prices. This does not say that high prices drive high market shares, nor that advertising creates high prices,
nor indeed is it the high prices that create the desire to advertise.
5Anderson and Renault (2006) show that a rm may be hurt by information disclosure about its own
product, so there might be incentives for competitors to provide that information through comparative ads.
3
ing a full equilibrium model and is concerned with modeling demand, with the notable early
exception of Roberts and Samuelson (1988). Our work is more directly comparable to papers
that analyze an equilibrium static model (Gasmi, La¤ont, and Vuong, 1992, and Sovinsky
Goeree, 2008). The choice of a static model is driven by practical considerations.6 We also
contribute to this literature by using a combination of exogenous shocks and brand-specic
generic prices to construct sources of exogenous variation in the data. By contrast, Gasmi,
La¤ont, and Vuong (1992) use aggregate variables (e.g. the price of sugar).7
To estimate the model we need to determine the amount spent on comparative advertis-
ing. This poses a challenge because advertising spending by brands, even when the data are
available, is not broken down into comparative and self-promotion advertising.8 Ideally, we
should analyze an industry for which comparative advertising is prevalent and represents a
large fraction of industry sales, and for which data on advertising expenditures is available
for a full sample of brands and for a reasonably long period of time. Video les (or audio
les for radio ads or photographic les for newspaper/magazine ads) need to be available
and their content readily coded to determine targets. Fortunately, all these criteria are met
with the US OTC industry (medicine for minor pain relief, including major brands Advil,
Aleve, Bayer Aspirin, and Tylenol).9 We watched over four thousand individual video les of
all TV advertisements in the US OTC analgesics industry for 2001-2005 and recorded which
brand(s) (or class of drugs) were compared (e.g. to Advil or Aleve; or to Ibuprofen-based
drugs).
In the empirical analysis we deal with left-censoring of advertising (in some periods
some brands do not engage in some types of advertising - there are corner solutions) and
endogeneity of market shares and advertising expenditures. We control for left-censoring
6A dynamic equilibrium analysis would be too computationally complex.
7Sovinsky Goeree (2008) uses the type of instrumental variables introduced by Bresnahan (1987). This
is infeasible here because there is no entry of new products.
8See Liaukonyte (2011) for a paper that estimates demand-side parameters using the same dataset.
9While explicit comparative advertising has ourished in the US over the past 20 years (with the blessing
of the FTC), it varies widely across industries. The US OTC analgesics industry exhibits high advertising
levels in general, and extraordinary levels of explicit comparative claims. Most of advertising expenditures
(around 90%) are for TV ads.
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by running Tobit regressions. We control for endogeneity with brand xed e¤ects and two
sources of exogenous variation: medical news shocks that hit the OTC analgesic market in
the analyzed time period,10 and the prices of generic products, which we use as instrumental
variables for the shares of the branded products.
The attack matrix identies diversion ratios between brand pairs. Our empirical estimates
are consistent with theory in the sense that, for any brand, the sum of diversion ratios to
other brands is less than one. Diversion ratios are used to nd damage and spillover measures
of comparative advertising.
Our empirical ndings highlight how comparative advertising is inherently di¤erent from
self-promotion. We nd that outgoing attacks are about half as powerful as direct self-
promotion ads in raising the brands own perceived quality. But these attacks have a strong
impact in terms of the damage that they cause to the target. This damage is heterogeneous
across attacker-target pairs. For example, a marginal dollar of comparative advertising spent
by Tylenol against Bayer reduces Bayers prot by $2, but a marginal dollar spent by Advil
against Tylenol reduces Tylenols prot by $3. These losses are much larger than what they
would be if advertising was pure self-promotion. For instance if Tylenol increased its self-
promotion expenditure by $1, the decrease in its competitors prot would range between
3 cents for Excedrin and 12 cents for Advil. Hence, much of the harm from comparative
advertising comes from its specic negative impact on the targets perceived quality. We nd
that higher shares, ceteris paribus, are associated with higher self-promotion advertising.
Each extra consumer raises self-promotion advertising by 55 cents.
Comparative advertising also has substantial positive spillovers to rivals that are not
being attacked. For example, a marginal dollars comparative attack by Tylenol on Aleve
increases Advils prot by 20 cents. This means that the benet the third party gets from
denigration of the targets quality is larger than the loss from an improved perception of the
attacker. These results indicate substantial "free-riding" in attacking any given target.
Despite the positive spillovers, the total damage to the industry (i.e., harm to target
10The idea of using a natural experiment to study the e¤ect of advertising (on prices) is the crucial insight
in Milyo and Waldfogel (1999).
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minus the benets to other industry members) remains substantial. Our measures of the
damage to the target are consistently and substantially above 1, which underscores the harm
inicted by comparative advertising: outgoing attacks cause much more damage to the target
than benet to the attacker. Our measures of spillovers are too small to make up for the
di¤erence. For example, the positive spillover to Advil of Aleves marginal dollar attack on
Tylenol is 39 cents, while the damage to Tylenol is over $3. These large numbers concur
with the idea that comparative advertising can be very damaging overall, as suggested by
the fact that they are used in few industries, and by commentators on the harmful e¤ects of
negative campaign ads in the political sphere.
2 The Model
2.1 Core Concepts
Using our coded advertising data we construct attack matrices of how much is spent by each
advertiser against each rival target every month. These attack matrices allow us to identify
diversion ratios that measure the substitutability between products. These diversion ratios
are then used to nd damage measures to a brands prot from comparative advertising
directed at that brand by di¤erent rivals. We now provide the intuition behind the use of
diversion ratios, and link them to damage measures.
Let j = Qj   pj be Brand js attractiveness when it has quality Qj and sets price pj,
and assume that market shares depend on js attractiveness relative to its competitors. The
diversion ratio from good j to k is the fraction of the market share lost by Brand j (due to
a decrease in js attractiveness) that is captured by Brand k.11 It is dened as
djk =  dsk=dj
dsj=dj
2 (0; 1) ; (1)
where sj is the market share of Brand j. One way to think of djk is in terms of consumers
second preferences: some consumers switch to their next preferred option when the rst
11The diversion ratio has been proposed as a useful statistic for analyzing the price e¤ects of mergers (see
for example Shapiro, 1996, and recent development by Ja¤e and Weyl, 2011).
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choice gets less attractive. For substitute di¤erentiated products, djk is positive, and
P
k
djk <
1 because some customers no longer purchase at all when j gets less attractive.
It is useful to interpret the diversion ratio as the neutralizing price change that keeps js
market share the same after a drop of $1 in ks attractiveness (e.g., following a rise in ks
price by $1). Such a lower rival attractiveness causes a ( dsj=dk) increase in js market
share. Now, this is exactly the market share picked up by k if js attractiveness went down
$1, because the switching consumers are those broadly indi¤erent between j and k as rst
choice. This symmetry property implies that the increase in js market share is equivalently
( dsk=dj).12 On the other hand, a rise in js price of pj will cause js market share to
drop by pj (dsj=dj). Equating these expressions gives the neutralizing price change as13
pj =
 dsk=dj
dsj=dj
= djk: (2)
The importance of the neutralizing price change is that we can measure the change in js
prot from a decrease in ks attractiveness as simply the price change applied to js market,
or j = pjMsj = Msjdjk, where M is the market base of potential consumers. This
underscores why it is the outbound diversion ratio, djk, that matters in determining the worth
of inbound customers. It also suggests that the diversion ratio should enter the marginal
benet for Brand j of targeting Brand k through comparative advertising, which adversely
impacts Qk. Indeed, let $1 spent by j on comparative advertising against target k reduce
Qk by Qk (which is a positive number because it is dened as a reduction): this negative
impact on ks attractiveness we call the pull e¤ect. The neutralizing price change argument
above gives the marginal benet for Brand j from the pull e¤ect as MsjdjkQk.
Because comparative advertising is also advertising for Brand j, there is also a push
e¤ect from an increase in Brand js attractiveness. This is the amount of pure self-promotion
spending that would result in the same change in js attractiveness as a $1 increase in
comparative advertising, and is therefore the marginal rate of substitution between them.
12See Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992), Ch.3, p. 67.
13If a $1 price rise by k allows j to pick up 10 of the customers shed by k, and a $1 price rise by j loses
it 50 consumers (10 of which would go to j, incidentally, by the symmetry property), then the neutralizing
price hike for j is 20 cents. The diversion ratio from j to k is 1=5.
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We assume it is constant at rate . Because the push e¤ect of a comparative ad returns 
per dollar, optimal arrangement of the ad portfolio implies the pull e¤ect must return 1  
per dollar (whenever comparative advertising is used against a target). Hence the optimal
comparative advertising strategy of Brand j is characterized byMsjdjkQk = 1  for any
rival k it chooses to target. Diversion ratios may then be identied from the condition that
comparative advertising expenditures should equate the marginal benet to the marginal
advertising cost (which is $1).
The above condition also indicates that once we know the diversion ratios, we can write
the drop in Brand ks attractiveness induced by one more dollar of comparative advertising
by j targeted at k as Qk = 1 Msjdjk . This is therefore also the amount by which k must
reduce its price to neutralize the hit to Qk. Similarly, using the neutralizing price change
interpretation of dkj, it is readily shown that
dkj
Msj
is the drop in price that Brand k must
incur in order to maintain its market share if Brand j were to raise Qj by increasing its self-
promotion by $1 from its equilibrium level: a $1 comparative ad only raises Qj by a fraction
 of what $1 self-promotion does. Pulling all this together, the harm to ks equilibrium prot
of one more dollar of comparative advertising by j is:14
Msk

1  
Msjdjk
+ 
dkj
Msj

; (3)
where the rst term in parentheses is the price drop that neutralizes the pull-down to Qk
and the second one is the price drop that neutralizes the push-up to Qj.
2.2 Demand
Suppose that Brand j = 1; :::n charges price pj and has perceived quality Qj (:), j = 1; :::n.
We retain the subscript j on Qj (:) because when we get to the estimation, exogenous vari-
ables such as medical news shocks and random variables summarizing the unobserved deter-
minants of perceived quality will enter the errors in the equations to be estimated.
Brands can increase own perceived quality through both types of advertising, and degrade
competitorsquality through comparative advertising. Comparative advertising, by its very
14Our analysis below derives this using the envelope theorem.
8
nature of comparing, both raises own perceived quality and reduces the perceived quality of
rival brands. The corresponding arguments of Qj (:) are advertising expenditure by Brand j
which directly promotes its own product, denoted by Ajj; outgoingadvertising by Brand
j targeted against Brand k, Ajk, k 6= j, which has a direct positive e¤ect; and incoming
comparative advertising by Brand k targeting Brand j, Akj, k 6= j, which has a negative
(detraction) e¤ect on Brand js perceived quality. Thus, we write js perceived quality as
Qj(Ajj; fAjkgk 6=j; fAkjgk 6=j); j = 1; :::; n, which is increasing in the rst argument, increasing
in each component of the second (outgoing) group, and decreasing in each component of the
third (incoming) group, with @
2Qj
@A2jj
< 0 and @
2Qj
@A2kj
> 0 for k 6= j.15
The demand side is generated by a discrete choice model of individual behavior where
each consumer buys one unit of her most preferred good. We will not estimate this demand
model from (aggregate) choice data; we simply use it to frame the structure of the demand
system. Preferences are described by a (conditional indirect) utility function:
Uj = j + "j; j = 0; 1; :::; n; (4)
in standard fashion, where "j is a brand-idiosyncratic match value and
j = Qj (:)  pj (5)
is the objectiveutility, and where we let the outside option(of not buying an OTC pain
remedy) be associated with an objective utility 0.
The distribution of the random terms determines the form of the market shares, sj;
j = 0; :::; n, and each sj is increasing in its own objective utility, and decreasing in rivals
objective utilities.16 Assume that there are M consumers in the market, so that the total
demand for brand j is Msj, j = 0; :::; n.
15Throughout, we assume su¢ cient concavity that the relevant second order conditions hold.
16For example, sj =
exp[j=]
nP
k=0
exp[k=]
, j = 0; :::; n in the standard multinomial logit model.
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2.3 Equilibrium Relations
Assume that product j is produced by Brand j at constant marginal cost, cj. Brand j0s
prot-maximizing problem is:
Max
fpj ;Ajg
j =M(pj   cj)sj   Ajj  
X
k 6=j
Ajk j = 1; :::n: (6)
where the advertising quantities (the As) are dollar expenditures.
Prices and advertising levels are determined simultaneously in a Nash equilibrium.
The price condition is determined in the standard manner by:
dj
dpj
=Msj  M(pj   cj)dsj
dj
= 0; j = 1; :::n; (7)
which yields a solution pj > cj: brands always select strictly positive mark-ups.
Self-promotion advertising expenditures are determined (for j = 1; :::; n) by:
dj
dAjj
=
dj
dj
:
@Qj
@Ajj
  1 =M(pj   cj)dsj
dj
@Qj
@Ajj
  1  0; with equality if Ajj > 0 (8)
where the partial derivative function @Qj
@Ajj
may depend on any or all of the arguments of Qj.
Substituting the pricing rst-order condition (7) into the advertising one (8) gives
Msj
@Qj
@Ajj
 1; with equality if Ajj > 0; j = 1; :::; n:17 (9)
The interpretation is that raisingAjj by $1 and raising price by $
@Qj
@Ajj
too leaves j unchanged.
This change, therefore, increases revenue by $ @Qj
@Ajj
on the existing consumer base (i.e., Msj
consumers). This extra revenue is equated to the $1 cost of the change, the RHS of (9). The
relation in (9) implicitly determines self-promotion as a function of whatever advertising
variables are in Qj (these all involve brand j as either sender or target), along with js share.
Recalling our assumption that @
2Qj
@A2jj
< 0, from (9), brands with larger sj will advertise
more (choose a higher value of Ajj) than those with smaller market shares, ceteris paribus.
The intuition is that the advertising cost per customer is lower for larger brands. The other
17Below we (implicitly) invoke su¢ cient concavity of Qj for interior solutions to (9): if
@Qj
@Ajj
were constant
(if ads entered perceived quality linearly), then this is unlikely.
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relations in the following proposition follow similarly from the implicit function theorem
through the dependence of perceived quality on self-promotion, and incoming and outgoing
attacks. Through the next series of Propositions, we emphasize the various second derivatives
of the Q function because these correspond to the parameters we estimate.
Proposition 1 (Self-promotion Advertising levels) Brand js choice of self-promotion
advertising level is determined by Msj
@Qj
@Ajj
 1; with equality if Ajj > 0. For Ajj > 0, Ajj is
an increasing function of sj; Ajj is a decreasing function of Ajk i¤
@2Qj
@Ajj@Ajk
< 0; Ajj is an
increasing function of Akj i¤
@Qj
@Ajj@Akj
> 0.
The advertising relationships in the Proposition 1 hold for brands with large enough
market shares.18 They will be estimated below using a simple Qj specication for which Ajj
is written as a linear function of sj and the other relevant advertising quantities.
We now turn to comparative advertising levels. An attack raises own perceived quality
and decreases that of the targeted rival. We can determine the advertising spending against
rivals by di¤erentiating (6) to get (for k 6= j):
dj
dAjk
=
dj
dj
:
@Qj
@Ajk
+
dj
dk
:
@Qk
@Ajk
  1
= M(pj   cj)dsj
dj
@Qj
@Ajk| {z }
own Q enhancement
+ M(pj   cj)(dsj
dk
)
@Qk
@Ajk| {z }
competitors Q denigration
  1  0;
with equality if Ajk > 0. We proceed by substituting the attacker pricing condition and its
self-promotion condition to rewrite this comparative advertising condition in a form to be
estimated. First, inserting the price rst-order conditions (7) gives (for k 6= j):
dj
dAjk
=Msj
@Qj
@Ajk
 Msjdjk @Qk
@Ajk
 1; with equality if Ajk > 0; (10)
where djk > 0 is the diversion ratio discussed in sub-section 2.1 above. Loosely, the diversion
ratio measures how much custom is picked up from a rival per customer it sheds. The
restriction on the diversion ratios (djk 2 [0; 1]) motivates restrictions below in the estimation.
18Otherwise, from (7) the term (pj  cj) dsjdj is small enough that the derivative
dj
dj
in (8) is negative when
@Qj
@Ajj
is evaluated at Ajj = 0.
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The comparative advertising derivative, (10), provides a bound on the size of the mar-
ginal rate of substitution between outgoing comparative advertising and self-promotion
( @Qj
@Ajk
=
@Qj
@Ajj
). Assume for the present argument that the solution for self-promotion spending
(see (9)) is interior. Then, substituting the self-promotion condition (Msj
@Qj
@Ajj
= 1) into (10)
implies
@Qj
@Ajk
=
@Qj
@Ajj
 1 +Msjdjk @Qk
@Ajk
(11)
where the LHS is less than one because @Qk
@Ajk
< 0 on the RHS. In summary:
Proposition 2 (Self-promotion and outgoing comparative advertising) If Brand j
uses a strictly positive amount of self-promotion, then the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween outgoing comparative advertising against Brand k and self-promotion ( @Qj
@Ajk
=
@Qj
@Ajj
) is
strictly below 1.
If this were not the case, then comparative advertising would drive out self-promotion
since it would give a direct own-quality benet per dollar greater than self-promotion, while
additionally helping the attacker by denigrating a rival. We will assume in the estimation
that the marginal rate of substitution between outgoing comparative advertising and self-
promotion in (11) is constant, at rate , so that the testable implication of Proposition 2 is
that  < 1. Then we can write from (11):
(0 <)  Msjdjk @Qk
@Ajk
 1  ; with equality if Ajk > 0: (12)
The intuition is as follows for Ajk > 0. The term 1   on the RHS of (12) is the marginal
cost of the pull e¤ect once we subtract the value of the push component of the comparative
attack. Hence the LHS should be the marginal benet of the pull e¤ect. To see that this
is so, rst note that the pull e¤ect of raising Ajk by $1 is equivalent to brand k raising its
price by $ @Qk
@Ajk
(since the same k is attained). The neutralizing price change for j that just
keeps sj intact per dollar increment in pk is given by (2) as djk, and this benet is reaped
on js market base of Msj. The LHS of (12) then follows directly.
To determine predictions for how Ajk depends on the other relevant advertising levels,
we apply the implicit function theorem to (12) and recall that @
2Qk
@A2jk
> 0.
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Proposition 3 (Comparative Advertising levels) The choice of comparative advertising
level by Brand j against Brand k is determined by  Msjdjk @Qk@Ajk  1   , with equality if
Ajk > 0. For Ajk > 0, Ajk is: (i) an increasing function of djk and sj; (ii) a decreasing
function of Alk i¤
@2Qk
@Ajk@Alk
> 0; (iii) an increasing function of Akk i¤
@2Qk
@Akk@Ajk
< 0; (iv) an
increasing function of Akl i¤
@2Qk
@Akl@Ajk
< 0; .
From Proposition 3(i), there are more attacks for given diversion ratio djk the higher the
attacker market share. This is roughly borne out in the raw data insofar as Advil and Aleve
are the largest attackers of Tylenol. Likewise, for a given attacker share, attacks are larger
for a bigger diversion ratio.19 We shall proceed for the estimation by estimating djk for each
pair. Thus we are implicitly constraining the diversion ratios to be constant over time.
From Proposition 3(ii), attacks by j against k increase with attacks on k by others if
and only if @
2Qk
@Ajk@Alk
< 0. This cross partial sign implies that more harm is inicted with a
marginal attack by j when othersattacks render k more susceptible.
The third property in Proposition 3 depends on the sign of the cross partial @
2Qk
@Akk@Ajk
;
we now argue that the last one does too. Indeed, the cross-partial @
2Qk
@Akl@Ajk
(used in the
fourth property) has the same sign as does @
2Qk
@Akk@Ajk
because we know @Qk
@Akl
=  @Qk
@Akk
with
both derivatives positive by assumption, and  therefore positive, so the assumption of 
constant implies the two cross partials have the same sign.
Hence, the last two properties in Proposition 3 are both determined by the sign of the
cross partial @
2Qk
@Akk@Ajk
, which is estimated in the self-promotion equation. Hence, applying
Proposition 1 to 3(iii) and 3(iv) yields the next result.
Corollary. If self-promotion is increasing with incoming comparative advertising then
comparative advertising decreases with target self-promotion and with target outgoing com-
parative advertising.
These are implications of the model, and not imposed by functional form. The intuition
is that a brand is attacked less when it advertises more if having more outgoing ads reduces
19Alternatively, we can write sjdjk = skDjk where Djk =
sj
sk
djk is the ratio of cross elasticity of demand
to own elasticity. In this case, for a given value of Djk, a bigger target is attacked more. This roughly
concurs with the data that the largest rm, Tylenol, is attacked most.
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the negative impact of attacks (i.e., @
2Qk
@Akk@Ajk
> 0), and this is also the condition for a brand
to want to engage in more self-promotion when attacked more (its marginal benet rises
with incoming attacks).
We now show how the damage to a rival from js self-promotion depends on the diversion
ratio. The e¤ect on ks prots, k =M (p

k   ck) sk Akk 
P
l 6=k A

kl (where the stars denote
equilibrium values) holding constant all other brandsactions (except the best-reply of k) is
determined by the envelope theorem as
dk
dAjj
= M (pk   ck)
dsk
dj
@Qj
@Ajj
=  sk
sj
dkj (13)
where at the second step we have substituted in ks pricing condition (7) and the equality
version of (9).
Similarly, the measure of the damage of an extra dollar of comparative advertising from
Brand j against target k is a weighted average of push and pull e¤ects, both of which can be
written in terms of diversion ratios. Using the envelope theorem, the full e¤ect of a marginal
dollar of comparative advertising from j on k0s prots, with all other brandsactions xed
is
dk
dAjk
=M (pk   ck)

dsk
dk
@Qk
@Ajk
+
dsk
dj
@Qj
@Ajk

:
Substituting in ks pricing condition (see (7)) implies
dk
dAjk
= Msk

@Qk
@Ajk
  dkj @Qj
@Ajk

=  sk
sj

1  
djk
+ dkj

(14)
where we have substituted in the equality versions of conditions (12) and (9) at the second
step.20 The interpretation of (14) in terms of neutralizing prices was given in Section 2.1 (see
(3)). Basically, the rst term here is the amount of self-promotion required to restore Qk
and the second term is the harm inicted by the rivals increased self-promotion component
20Equivalently, we can write this as d

k
dAjk
= (1  )Pulljk + Pushjk = (1 )Djk + Dkj .
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of the comparative advertising (hence the  weight corresponding to the push e¤ect). Note
that the e¤ect on prot here and below is measured in dollars: equivalently (by the targets
optimality condition that the $1 marginal cost of an extra dollars advertising equals its
marginal benet), it is the amount of self-promotion advertising that would have to be spent
to o¤set the harm. The empirical analysis will provide parameter estimates so the marginal
harm can be estimated.
Proposition 4 (Damage Measure) Assume that target k engages in self-promotion, and
assume that outgoing comparative ads are perfectly substitutable with self-promotion at rate
 2 (0; 1). Then the prot lost by target k from an additional dollar of comparative adver-
tising attack by Brand j is the sum of a pull damage, 1 
djk
sk
sj
, and a push damage, dkj
sk
sj
.
In like manner we can determine the spillover benet (related to free riding in comparative
advertising) to l of an attack by j on k as
dl
dAjk
=
sl
sj

dlk
(1  )
djk
  dlj

: (15)
The rst term here is the direct benet to l from the harm inicted on k (pull); the second
is (as above) the damage incurred by l from j improving its quality through the compar-
ative advertising channel (push). This expression can readily be interpreted in terms of
neutralizing price changes.
3 Description of Industry and Data
The OTC analgesics market is worth approximately $2 billion in retail sales per year (includ-
ing generics) and covers pain-relief medications with four major active chemical ingredients.
These are Aspirin (ASP), Acetaminophen (ACT), Ibuprofen (IB), and Naproxen Sodium
(NS). The nationally advertised brands are such familiar brand names as Tylenol (ACT),
Advil and Motrin (IB), Aleve (NS), Bayer (ASP or combination), and Excedrin (ACT or
combination). Table 1 summarizes market shares, ownership, prices and advertising levels
in this industry.
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TABLE 1. Market Shares and Advertising Levels of OTC Analgesics Brands
Brand Active Price / Inside Max TA/ CA/ CA/ Owner-
Ing. serving Market Share Pills Revenue Revenue TA ship
Tylenol ACT $2.15 30.51% 7.2 17.4% 3.3% 19.3% McNeil
Advil IB $1.60 24.21% 5.9 20.0% 13.3% 66.4% Wyeth
Aleve NS $0.83 22.40% 3.0 26.0% 20.0% 75.7% Bayer
Excedrin ACT $2.40 8.28% 9.2 26.4% 3.4% 13.2% Novartis
Bayer ASP $1.85 6.98% 10.1 28.8% 6.4% 22.4% Bayer
Motrin IB $1.71 7.68% 5.9 20.4% 8.1% 39.6% McNeil
Generic ACT $1.17
Generic IB $0.66
Generic ASP $0.82
Generic NS $0.57
3.1 Sales Data
The sales data, collected by AC Nielsen, consist of prices and dollar total revenues of all
OTC oral analgesics products sold in the U.S. national market from March of 2001 through
December of 2005 (58 monthly observations).
We construct a measure of a serving of pain medication, or a pain episode, so that we
can aggregate across di¤erent package sizes and across di¤erent medication strengths.21 We
dene the market size, M , for OTC analgesic products as the US population 18 years or
older minus the number of people who buy pain medication at Wal-Mart, a store that does
not provide information on the sales of products. We then express each products sales as the
number of people whose pain could be relieved by that product for a period of three days,
which is the average number of pain days per month in the population.22. To this end we
assigned to each analgesic product in the sales dataset the strength of its active ingredient
in milligrams and derived the maximum number of pills that a consumer can take for OTC
analgesics consumption over 72 hours as dened by the FDA and required to be listed on
the labels (e.g. 9 in the case of Aleve, and from 18 to 36 for Tylenol, depending on the ACT
formulation). This we refer to as an episode of pain.
21A detailed description of how we construct the dataset is provided in Appendix A.
22This information is from the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Feb 27, 1998/47(07); 134-140.
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Then, we compute each brands market share as the fraction of total number of episodes
of pain sold by the brand over market size. The average price of a pain episode is computed
as the ratio of the total sales revenue of a brand in a month to the total number of episodes of
pain sold in that month. We do the same calculation for the generic products, which di¤er
from each other only by their active ingredient. The resulting output is the time series of
average prices of episodes of pain relief for each of the four active ingredients for the generic
products. We maintain that the generic products are provided by a competitive fringe and
that the generic prices are set equal to their marginal cost.
3.2 Advertising Data
Our advertising dataset is from TNS-Media Intelligence. The data include video les of all
TV advertisements for 2001-2005 for each brand advertised in the OTC analgesics category
and monthly advertising expenditures on each ad. The unit of observation in the raw dataset
is a single ad. There are 4; 506 unique ads (346 of which are missing videos).
We watched all the ads and coded their content. We recorded whether the product was
explicitly compared to any other products. If a commercial was comparative, we recorded
which brand (or class of drugs) it was compared to (e.g., to Advil or Aleve). If an ad had
multiple targets, the ad was assigned equally among them.
If an ad had no comparative claims, it was classied as a self-promotion ad. In the
data we observe situations when brands made indirect attacks on their competitors. An
indirect attack occurs when one brand makes a claim against all other regularbrands. We
code such indirect attacks as self-promotion. We discuss other coding scheme alternatives in
Appendix E.
Table 2 presents the complete picture of cross targeting and advertising expenditures on
each of the rival brands targeted. This table shows that every nationally advertised brand
used comparative advertising during the sample period. However, only four (of the six)
brands were targeted: Tylenol, Advil, Aleve, and Excedrin.23 These data provide some in-
23Motrin does not attack Tylenol because the parent company is the same; likewise, Bayer does not attack
Aleve for the same reason.
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formal support that larger brands both used more comparative advertising and were targeted
more. Entries on the diagonal are self-promotion expenditures.
TABLE 2. Advertising and Comparative Advertising Target Pairs
Adver- TARGET:
tiser + Advil Aleve Bayer Excedrin Motrin Tylenol Total CA Total
Advil 92.1 [50] 17.8 [27] - 4.3 [20] - 160.2 [58] 182.2 274.3
Aleve - 42.5 [45] 0.0 [3] 0.5 [7] - 131.7 [58] 132.1 174.7
Bayer 13.8 [25] - 104.9 [58] - - 15.7 [37] 29.5 131.8
Excedrin - 1.9 [7] 2.2 [7] 158.4 [47] - 19.9 [15] 24.1 182.5
Motrin 18.9 [27] 18.8 [27] - - 57.3 [54] - 37.6 94.9
Tylenol 9.6 [16] 31.7 [31] 36.6 [27] - - 359.0 [58] 77.8 404.0
Total 42.6 [68] 70.2 [92] 38.7 [34] 4.7 [27] - 327.5 483.4
Notes: Row j indicates the advertiser brand and Column k indicates the target. The left part of cell
jk is comparative ad expenditure in $m.; the right part denotes how many time periods [out of 58]
the attack pair jk happened. The diagonal entries are expenditures on self-promotional advertising.
3.3 News Shocks
The OTC analgesics market endured several major medical news shocks over the analyzed
time period. Following the approach presented by Chintagunta, Jiang, and Jin (2009) we
utilized Lexis-Nexis to search over all articles published between 2001 and 2005 on relevant
topics. We recorded the article name, source, and date to construct a dataset of news shocks.
Multiple articles reporting the same event were assigned to a unique shock ID. Additionally,
we checked whether a news shock was associated with any new medical ndings that were
published in major scientic journals. Finally, we focused only on the events that were
reported in a major national newspaper (USA Today, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal,
New York Times). After this data cleaning, our news shock dataset includes 8 major news
shocks between March of 2001 and December of 2005. Table 3 reports the news shocks by
their title, date, and the original scientic publication.
After some experimentation, we determined that the e¤ects of the news shocks fade out
after three months. Still we consider two possibilities for the duration of each news shock in
consumer memory. We construct a dummy variable for a short-term shock variant that takes
18
value 1 at time t when the shock occurred, and for the next three months (i.e., t through
t + 3). Then, to check the robustness of our analysis, we construct another variable, which
captures the possibility that consumers have a long-term memory. The dummy variable for
the long-term shock takes value 1 at time t till the end of the sample period.
TABLE 3. Medical News Shocks
No News Shock Description Date Source
1 Risk of Cardiovascular Events Associated 8/21/2001 Journal of the American Medical
With Selective COX-2 Inhibitors Assoc (JAMA); 2001,286:954-959
2 Ibuprofen Interferes with Aspirin 12/20/2001 New England Journal of Medicine,
2001, 345:1809-1817
3 FDA Panel Calls for Stronger Warnings 9/21/2002 FDA Public Health Advisory
on Aspirin and Related Painkillers
4 Aspirin Could Reduce Breast Cancer Risk/ 4/8/2003/ JAMA 2004; 291:2433-2440
NSAIDs Protect Against Alzheimers 4/2/2003 American Academy Of Neurology
5 Anti-Inammatory Pain Relievers Inhibit 9/9/2003 Circulation, 9/9/2003
Cardioprotective Benets of Aspirin
6 Vioxx Withdrawn From the Market 9/30/2004
7 Long Term Naproxen (Aleve) Use may 12/23/2004 FDA Public Health Advisory
Increased Cardiovascular Risk
8 Bextra Withdrawn 4/7/2005
4 The Econometric Model
4.1 A Quality Function
After extensive experimentation, we implement the following perceived quality function:
Qj (:) =  ln

Ajj + 
X
k 6=j
Ajk   
X
k 6=j
Akj + Ajj

 '
X
k 6=j
ln
 
Akj + Akj

+ Qj: (16)
Variables other than advertising levels pertaining to js perceived quality enter through Ajj,
Akj, and Qj. They include observed factors such as js product characteristics or news shocks
as well as unobserved factors that determine the realization of random shocks. They enter
the equations to be estimated only if they interact with advertising levels, that is only if
they enter Ajj or Ajk for some k. Here, we interpret Qj as the product di¤erentiation from
product characteristics and the remaining part of Qj (:) as the di¤erentiation induced by
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advertising. This distinction is important when we discuss the identication strategy and
we look into the nature of the structural unobservables because anything that enters into Qj
can be used as an instrumental variable in the advertising rst order conditions.
The push e¤ect is incorporated through the weighted sum of self-promotion and outgoing
comparative ads (Ajj + 
P
k 6=j Ajk), where  is the marginal rate of substitution between
outgoing comparative and self-promotion ads, which is assumed to be constant. In order
for self-promotion to favorably impact perceived quality,  should be positive. Recall from
Proposition 2 that we should expect  < 1. Whether there is a push e¤ect for Brand j
associated with its comparative advertising activity against rivals depends on whether  is
strictly positive or not.24
The pull e¤ect from incoming comparative ads (Akj) impacts the quality function in two
ways. First, it enters the net persuasionterm inside the rst logarithm. The sign of  gives
the sign of the cross e¤ect between incoming attacks and outgoing ads. Second, incoming
ads enter in a separable way with associated parameter . This additional term allows for
disassociating the intensity of the overall pull e¤ect from the intensity of the cross e¤ect
between incoming attacks and outgoing ads as measured by .25 Through this separable
term, we also allow the Akj to be imperfect substitutes with one another. Since attacks on
target k constitute a public good for all the brands other than k, if expenditures attacking k
were perfect substitutes, then there would be only one attacker in equilibrium in each period.
The data show that this is not the case.
The comparative statics properties in Propositions 1 and 3 that link self-promotion and
comparative advertising expenditures are determined by the signs of parameters , , and
.26
24 < 0 would mean that js brand image is hurt by the use of comparative advertising, in line with
conventional wisdom among marketers in continental Europe.
25With  large enough, it also ensures that @
2Qk
@A2jk
> 0 locally.
26This specication of Q imposes the sign of the cross e¤ect between attacks by k on j and attacks by some
other Brand l on j to have the sign of  2 so it is negative (provided that  is found to be positive). Then
from Proposition 3, more attacks by other brands on j induce more comparative advertising by k against j.
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4.2 The Equations To Be Estimated
The rst order condition for self-promotion ads, corresponding to equation (9) above may
be written as
Ajjt = Msjt   
P
k 6=j Ajkt + 
P
k 6=j Akjt   Ajjt;
Ajjt  N
 
jjt; 
2
SP

; Ajjt = max
 
Ajjt; 0

; j = 1; :::; n:
(17)
A very attractive feature of our modeling strategy is that Ajjt incorporates the structural
unobservable component of perceived quality that interacts with Ajjt. Subscripts j and t
on the mean term reect some possible brand xed e¤ect as well as the possible impact of
some observable shocks such as news shocks. The equation above is a Tobit regression that
is linear in the parameters.
The rst order condition for comparative ads follows from rst writing (12) for the spec-
ication of quality (16) above. This gives
 Msjtdjkt
 
 
Akkt + 
P
l 6=k Aklt   
P
l 6=k Alkt + Akkt
    Ajkt + Ajkt
!
 1  ;
with equality if Ajkt > 0. Second, using the target ks self-promotion equation (9) when
Akkt > 0 (namely Akkt+
P
l 6=k Aklt 
P
l 6=k Alkt+ Akkt = Mskt), we obtain the following
econometric specication:(
Ajkt = 'Msjt
sktdjk
(1 )skt sjtdjk   Ajkt;
Ajkt  N
 
jkt; 
2
CA

; Ajkt = max
 
Ajkt; 0

; j = 1; :::; n:
(18)
as long as Akkt > 0. Here again, the structural unobservable is in Ajkt. In our estimation
strategy, we assume that diversion ratios are constant over time, and given by djkt = djk.
Equation (18) is a Tobit regression that is nonlinear in the parameters.
Some of the rms in our analysis are multi-brand rms. Motrin and Tylenol are owned
by McNeil, and Aleve and Bayer are owned by Bayer. We treat each brand as making
independent decisions. This is not a problem at all for the self-promotion equation, which is
exactly the same if we allow rms to behave as multi-brand rms that maximize joint pay-
o¤s. However, the comparative ad equation would be modied to include cross-brand e¤ects.
This would require the estimation of a large number of additional diversion ratios with the
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same number of observations, which in exploratory work resulted in many diversion ratios
being imprecisely estimated. We therefore treat brands as independent divisions maximizing
brand prots, modulo the imposition that they do not attack sibling products as concurs
with the data in this respect.
4.3 Identication Strategy
In both Tobit specications above, the unobservables are correlated with the explanatory
advertising and share variables because the brands take them into consideration when making
their advertising and pricing decisions. The rst, most straightforward, step to address the
endogeneity of these variables is to exploit the panel structure of our data to account for time-
constant di¤erences across brands. Essentially, for the self-promotion equation, we set Ajjt =
Ajj +  Ajjt, where Ajj is a brand xed e¤ect, while  Ajjt are time-specic idiosyncratic
shocks. We do not follow the same approach for the comparative ad equation since this
would require estimating many pair specic dummy variables Ajk, which cannot be achieved
with much precision, given our limited number of observations. Hence the endogeneity of
shares in the comparative ad equation (18) is only dealt with using instrumental variables,
as described below. The dummy variables in the self-promotion equation (17) control for a
brands advertising base allure advantage, which picks up any persistent component of such
an advantage. The remaining source of endogeneity in our regressions then comes from any
potential correlation of temporary shocks, here picked up by Ajjt and Ajkt, with advertising
expenditures and shares.
The second step is to explore whether the data on news shocks can explain some of
the correlation of  Ajjt and Ajkt with advertising expenditures and shares. That is, brands
observe the shocks, which a¤ect their shares, and which a¤ect their advertising and pricing
decisions. Thus, if we include the news shocks as being part of  Ajjt, then we deal with some
of the correlation between the temporary shocks on perceived quality and the advertising
expenditures and shares. News shocks are clearly exogenous because they require newmedical
discoveries, which surprise both consumers and brands, and alter the perception of the
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health properties of the products.27
Finally and alternatively, we use an instrumental variable approach. Rather than as-
suming that news shocks contribute to the advertising base allure terms, Ajjt and Akjt, we
suppose that their impact is separable from that of advertising expenditures, although they
enter the brands perceived quality. In other words they only enter the Qj term in (16).
They are therefore proper candidates for instrumental variables. In addition, generic prices
and various functions of them can be used as instrumental variables as long as the marginal
cost of production of a generic product does not depend on the quantity produced. Pricing at
constant marginal cost for mature generic pharmaceutical products seems to be a reasonable
assumption (Grabowski and Vernon, 1992).
To implement the estimation in our non-linear models, we use control functions (Heckman
and Robb 1985, 1986). Our methodology follows Blundell and Smith (1986) and Rivers and
Vuong (1988). Consider the self-promotion equation. Using control functions consists of
rewriting the unobservable Ajjt as a linear function of v, the unobservable of the rst stage
reduced form regression, and of , a white noise term. For example, say that only shares
are suspected to be endogenous. Then, v is the unobservable of a reduced form regression
of the shares on all the exogenous variables, including the instrumental variables. We can
then use the residuals from that reduced form regression, v^, and plug them in the regression
(17) as follows: Ajjt = Msjt   
P
k 6=j Ajkt + 
P
k 6=j Akjt + v^ + , where  is now the
unobservable that generates the Tobit model. The nice feature of this approach is that we
can test the exogeneity of the shares by testing whether  = 0. With three endogenous
variables, we have three control functions, but the problem is conceptually identical. The
only econometric di¢ culty in the application of this methodology is created by the fact that
two of the explanatory variables in the self-promotion equation,
P
k 6=j Ajkt and
P
k 6=j Akjt,
are left-censored, and thus the estimated residuals that are required to construct the control
functions would be biased whenever the variables are zero. To address this econometric
problem, we derive the generalized residuals, as proposed by Gourieroux et al. (1987). We
27This works better for consumers: rms are more likely to know when ndings are in the o¢ ng.
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describe the econometric approach in detail in Appendix B. Because of the nonlinear nature
of all these problems we estimate the system of the two equations (17) and (18) separately
rather than with the generalized method of moments (as in Sovinsky Goeree, 2008).
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Self-Promotion
Each column in Table 4 presents the results for the parameters ; ; and  for various
specications of Equation (17). Across all specications, ; ; and  are positive and statis-
tically signicant. The results in Proposition 1 that larger shares are associated with more
self-promotion advertising is reected in the positive sign of . Outgoing attacks have a
push-up self-promotion impact measured by  > 0. However, because  < 1, comparative
advertising does not drive out self-promotion, as per Proposition 2. The direct own-quality
benet per dollar is smaller than the benet from self-promotion. Finally,  > 0 means
that self-promotion increases with incoming advertising. This reects a positive cross e¤ect,
which, by Proposition 3, implies that comparative advertising decreases with target self-
promotion. None of these empirical results reject the theoretical model. Next, we investigate
the economic signicance of the results in Table 4.
Column 1 of Table 4 shows the results from a straightforward Tobit regression, where self-
promotion ad expenditures are regressed on sales, outgoing attacks and incoming attacks.
We estimate  = 0:123, which means that a brand would spend 12 cents a month more in
self-promotion per additional customer. The marginal rate of substitution between outgoing
attacks and self-promotion ads is  = 0:768, meaning that the self-promotion value of $1 of
outgoing comparative ads is the same as 77 cents of pure self-promotion. The value  = 0:429
provides a lower bound to how much additional self-promotion expenditures will o¤set one
more dollar of attacks on the brand (43 cents).28 We now investigate how the results change
when we address the endogeneity of the explanatory variables.
28It is not the full extent of the negative impact of attacks on the brands perceived quality. This requires
knowing , which is identied from estimating the comparative advertising equations (18).
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In Column 2 we run the Tobit regression including a dummy variable that is equal to 1
if the observation is for one of the top brands (Advil, Aleve, Tylenol), and zero otherwise.29
Thus, we have jjt = 
TB for a top brand and jjt = 
OB otherwise. Using this specication,
the coe¢ cient estimate of  drops from 0:768 to 0:660 and the coe¢ cient estimate of  drops
from 0:429 to 0:297. In contrast, the coe¢ cient estimate of  increases from 0:123 to 0:432.
The contrasting direction of the bias between the advertising explanatory variables and the
shares reects the relationship between the unobserved component of perceived quality and
the explanatory variables. In particular, it is reasonable to think that products with a higher
unobserved component of perceived quality will have a larger market share, ceteris paribus.
Then, the downwards bias on  when the xed e¤ect is omitted means that brands with
a stronger unobserved component of perceived quality do less self-promotion advertising,
ceteris paribus. Similarly, the upwards bias on the estimates for  and  means that brands
with a higher perceived quality are attacked less and attack rivals less than brands with a
lower perceived quality. These predictions are consistent with our specication of perceived
quality, which assumes a negative cross partial between Ajj and outgoing ads and a positive
cross partial between Ajj and incoming attacks. This discussion is mirrored by the result on
the coe¢ cient estimate of the Top Brand dummy. The Top Brand xed e¤ect, ATBjj is equal
to  0:353. It has a negative sign, which means that the larger brands, Aleve, Tylenol, and
Advil have inherently higher advertising base allure than the other brands.
In Column 3 we add the variables that measure the occurrence of a news shock using
the short term memory denition. With the exception of the estimate of  that increases
from 0:432 to 0:513, the results in Column 3 are remarkably similar to those in Column
2, suggesting that adding the short-term memory news shocks as control variables does not
change the way the model ts the data. This is consistent with the low values of the F
statistic associated with the test that all the coe¢ cients of the news shocks are equal to
zero. The results in Column 4 show that adding the long-term memory news shocks as
control variables does not change the way the model ts the data either.
29More discussion on the use of a top brand dummy variable is available in Appendix C.
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To investigate whether we should still be concerned about any remaining endogeneity of
sj,
P
k 6=j Ajkt, and
P
k 6=j Akjt, we run three instrumental variable regressions. In Column 5
the instrumental variables are the generic prices of the product that shares the same active
ingredient and the sum of the generic prices over all the competing active ingredients. In
Column 6 we add the short-term memory news shocks, which are then excluded from the
second stage regression. In Column 7 we instead add long-term memory news shocks. We
nd that the instrumental variables do a fair job at explaining the rst stage variation in
outgoing comparative advertising and in incoming attacks. The rst-stage F tests reject
the null hypotheses that generic prices do not explain any of the rst stage variation, and
the F statistics are quite large, except for the one associated with the rst stage regression
for
P
k 6=j Ajkt. Instrumental variables are less important to control for the endogeneity of
shares, since the brand dummies predict most of the variation in shares.
Columns 5-7 show that   0:55, which means that Brand j spends 55 cents per month
in self-promotion advertising per additional consumer. We also nd   0:6 which means
that each dollar spent in outgoing comparative advertising is worth approximately 60 cents
in raising own perceived quality and the remaining 40 cents are gained from pulling down a
competitor.   0:44 means that incoming attacks have at least a damage of 44 cents (and,
as we calculate below, the full damage is much larger). The results in Column 5 shows that
the variation in generic prices controls for the endogeneity of the variable
P
k 6=j Akjt and of
the variable sj. Notice that the estimate of  is the same in Columns 3-5, suggesting that
the instrumental variable approach controls for the endogeneity of sj to the same extent as
adding news shocks does. The control function for
P
k 6=j Ajkt is not statistically signicant,
suggesting (from Blundell and Smith, 1986) that the endogeneity of
P
k 6=j Ajkt is not empir-
ically signicant. Columns 6 and 7 show the coe¢ cient estimates do not change when we
add short or long term memory shocks to the generic prices, but in some cases the estimates
become slightly more precise.
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5.2 Comparative Advertising and Diversion Ratios
Table 5 presents the estimation results for the parameter ' and for the diversion ratios
djk. The diversion ratios are treated as parameters to be estimated from the data and are
restricted to be between 0 and 1. Treating diversion ratios as parameters avoids imposing
a functional form on demand. Rather, we are implicitly using a linear approximation. This
approximation strategy may be vindicated by the stability of market shares over the period.
Berry (1994) shows that, under fairly lenient regularity conditions on the joint distribution
of random terms in (4), there is an invertible relation between market shares and mean
utilities, j. Since diversion ratios are determined by the vector of mean utilities, they should
be essentially unchanged if market shares do not vary much.30
Recall that we use a two-step approach. We rst estimate (17). Then, we plug the
estimates of  and  into (18) to estimate ' and the diversion ratios. Thus, each Column
in Table 5 corresponds to one specication of (18) in Table 4. In particular: Columns 1 and
2 use the estimates of  and  that we obtain from Column 6 in Table 4; Column 3 uses
the estimates of  and  from Column 7 in Table 4; nally, Column 4 uses the estimates of
 and  from Column 5 of Table 4. All specications use the same number of observations
(601). Twelve diversion ratios are estimated. There are three reasons for a diversion ratio to
be missing. First, there were too few or no attack months so the variable was omitted. For
example, Aleve attacked Advil only three times (see Table 2). Second, there are no direct
attacks on siblings. For example, Bayer does not attack Aleve (both are owned by the
same parent company). Third, we do not estimate (18) whenever the attacker or the target
did no self-promotion (see also equation (11)).
The coe¢ cient estimates of the control functions for the shares of the attacker (sjt) and
of the attacked (skt) are statistically insignicant and of small magnitude in Columns 2-4,
implying that the endogeneity of market shares is not empirically signicant. This is not
surprising in light of the fact that market shares are quite stable over time while advertising
expenditures vary quite a bit (see Appendix A for more on this). Column 1, which presents
30The exception is Aleve, which su¤ered a loss of market share in 2005, but recovered in a few months.
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the main results for this section, does not include control functions. Henceforth we discuss
the economic implications of the coe¢ cient estimates in Column 1.
Consider the entry dAlT , the diversion ratio from Aleve to Tylenol. In the second column
we estimate dAlT equal to 0:153, meaning that if Aleve sheds 100 consumers through a price
rise (say), then 15:3 of them go to Tylenol. Now consider the entry dAdT , the diversion
ratio from Advil to Tylenol. We estimate dAdT to be virtually the same number. This is
fairly large, suggesting that Tylenol is a fairly large gainer from both Aleve and Advil. The
two brands attack Tylenol in very similar fashion. Looking back at Table 2, we observe that
Advil and Aleve both attack Tylenol every month. More striking is the fact that their overall
expenditures are very close, with Advil spending a total of $160 million and Aleve spending
$132 million attacking Tylenol.
The gure for dET is surprisingly low (at 10:2%) since Excedrin and Tylenol share aceta-
minophen as active ingredient in many of its variants, but it might indicate that Excedrin
serves specialty niches of consumers (Excedrin markets itself as a migraine medicine) in-
terested in its combinations with ca¤eine and with aspirin (which Tylenol does not have).
Motrin equally loses to Advil and Aleve an approximate 16%, despite sharing the same active
ingredient with Advil.
Next, Bayer loses even more (20:3%) to Tylenol, which suggests that consumers perceive
Tylenol as the closest substitute to Bayer. This concurs with the ndings of a number
of medical studies (e.g. Hyllested et al., 2002), according to which Tylenol is the second
safest branded OTC pain reliever, after Bayer (based on cardiovascular and gastrointestinal
risk proles). Yet, Tylenol loses more to Aleve than to Bayer, suggesting that substitution
patterns are not symmetric.31 Indeed, a price rise loses Tylenol just 11:9% to its 3 main
attackers, but it picks up at least that amount following a price increase by either of them.
31It is also possible, but we cannot check it given the data we have, that as far as Bayer is concerned,
consumers leaving Tylenol switch to the generic version of aspirin. Because generics do not use comparative
advertising, we cannot estimate those diversion ratios.
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The diversion ratios for each of the six brands sum to less than 1, as the theory hopes for
(we imposed them each to be below one, but we did not restrict the sum). For example, we
see that if a consumer leaves Tylenol, then that consumer will go with probability 2:6% to
Advil, 5:0% to Aleve, and 4:3% to Bayer. With the remaining 88:1% probability a consumer
will switch to the outside good or some other OTC analgesics, branded or generic.
There are three pairs for which we estimate the diversion ratios in both directions:
(Bayer; Tylenol; ), (Advil; Tylenol), (Aleve; Tylenol). Comparing them indicates relative
own demand derivatives. In particular, djk
dkj
= dsk=dk
dsj=dj
. Take for example j =Tylenol and
k =Bayer. Because we have dTB = 0:043 and dBT = 0:203 so dTBdBT is around
1
5
(so
dsT=dT  5dsB=dB). This means the demand derivative is much more price sensitive
for Tylenol. At rst blush, this may seem to presage a poor prospect for the estimates,
given that Tylenol has a much higher price than Bayer aspirin (suggesting a more inelastic
demand). However, a rough calibration brings this into perspective. The price of a serving
(here roughly 3 days of pain relief) of Tylenol is roughly $2:15; taking the generic price of
$1:17 as representing marginal cost gives a mark-up of approximately $1. A similar mark-
up is found for Bayer, with a brand price of $1:85 and a generic price of about $0:8. The
pricing equation (7) sets mark-up equal to demand over own demand derivative (in absolute
value). Using the market shares of 0:3 for Tylenol and 0:07 for Bayer (these are rough inside
market shares as a fraction of total market including generics, without outside good), the
pricing formula predicts a demand derivative for Tylenol of 0:3 and for Bayer of 0:067, which
gives us a 1-to-4.6 ratio that is very close to the one that we get from the ratio of diversion
ratios.
Whenever we have both diversion ratios, the diversion from small to large is greater than
vice versa. This property would hold with a logit demand (recall for logit djk =
sk
1 sj ). For
logit, djk is increasing in sk (as customers are shed, they go to other brands in proportion
to those brandsshares). This works well: the only, important, violation is from Tylenol
to Advil and Aleve. However, other properties of the logit do not hold. For logit, djk is
increasing in sj but we see no clear relation in the table of diversion ratios on this count.
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5.3 Damage and Spillover Measures
We now derive measures of the damage that comparative advertising delivers to the attacked
brand and the spillovers to other brands. We use the coe¢ cient estimates of  from Column
6 of Table 4 and of the diversion ratios and ' from Column 1 of Table 5.
As discussed when deriving (14), the full damage can be decomposed into a push and a
pull e¤ect. Table 6 shows the damage measures that we can estimate given the pattern of
attacks observed in the data. Targets are column entries, and attackers are on the rows. The
entries are written as dollar damages to targets from a $1 marginal increment in comparative
advertising by the attacker. These are all positive numbers, so are all costs inicted.32
The rst entry is the impact on k of js self-promotion push-up. From (13), the damage
to k is given as sk
sj
dkj, and so this term is reported whenever dkj is reported. If we multiply
this by  we get the impact of the push e¤ect of outgoing comparative advertising by j, and
hence the second term in (14). The second entry in the Table is the direct pull e¤ect of an
attack by j on k, which is given by the rst term in (14) as sk
sj
(1 )
djk
, and so this is reported
whenever djk is reported. When both e¤ects are reported (i.e., when we have the diversion
ratios in both directions), we can sum the pull e¤ect with  times the pure push e¤ect to
generate the third entry, which is the total damage on the target of a marginal dollar of
comparative advertising. We report the bootstrapped 90% condence intervals in square
brackets underneath the point estimates. Several remarks follow from Table 6.
First, imprecision in the results of Table 5 feeds through to imprecise results in Table 6.
This can lead to very large numbers via small diversion ratios that appear in the denominator
of the damage expressions. Still, some of the damage estimates (e.g. Advil on Tylenol) are
very precisely estimated, and show that the damage is between 3 and 4 dollars for a marginal
dollar of comparative advertising.
32The damage numbers can be interpreted as the amount of self-promotional advertising needed to com-
pensate for the marginal attack dollar.
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TABLE 6: Measures of Damage
Target:
Attacker: Advil Aleve Bayer Excedrin Motrin Tylenol
Advil N=A 0:044
[0:017;0:044]
N=A 0:053
[0:024;0:080]
0:033
[0:004;0:059]
7:874
[3:752;17:015]
N=A 9:694
[2:284;2:7e3]
N=A 3:197
[2:094;4:835]
N=A N=A N=A N=A 3:217
[2:112;4:853]
Aleve 0:049
[0:023;0:074]
0:056
[0:023;0:073]
0:068
[0:038;0:089]
N=A N=A 3:457
[2:387;5:273]
N=A N=A 3:499
[2:448;5:306]
Bayer N=A 0:191
[0:111;0:278]
8:810
[4:265;23:786]
8:358
[4:686;14:884]
N=A 8:475
[4:839;14:814]
Excedrin 0:040
[0:000;0:131]
N=A
N=A 14:011
[5:003;207:996]
N=A N=A
Motrin N=A N=A
7:284
[3:917;14:884]
6:987
[3:708;15:787]
N=A N=A
Tylenol 0:120
[0:080;0:150]
0:112
[0:075;0:140]
0:046
[0:027;0:067]
0:028
[0:002;0:061]
11:685
[4:839;71:037]
5:678
[3:238;9:906]
2:026
[1:113;3:552]
N=A
11:759
[4:925;71:093]
5:747
[3:347;9:962]
2:054
[1:170;3:569]
N=A
Notes: A row-column entry denotes attacker-target $ damage from a marginal $1 comparative
ad attack, split up from top down as push-up e¤ect damage from attackers self-promotion
component of comparison; pull-down e¤ect damage; and total damage as sum of these two.
Bootstrapped 90% condence intervals appear in square brackets underneath the point estimates.33
Second, the pull e¤ect is much larger than the push e¤ect (of self-promotion). For exam-
ple, when Advil attacks Tylenol, Tylenol su¤ers a $3.22 loss, but (marginal) self-promotion
by Advil only causes a 3 cent loss. The pull e¤ect is large because the target must be pulled
down a lot in order to induce a brand to use comparative advertising, since the fall-out is
shared among all other rivals (the size of the spillover is investigated below). This e¤ect is
33Condence intervals are based on 100 draws on the asymptotic distribution of the estimates from Column
6 of Table 4 and from Column 1 of Table 5.
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exacerbated by the fact that the push e¤ect of the comparative ad is only around half of
what it would be with self-promotion.
Third, the asymmetry between the Bayer-Tylenol numbers is striking. Tylenol needs
$8.48 to negate a marginal Bayer attack, but Bayer needs only $2.05 to o¤set a marginal
Tylenol attack. The di¤erence between Aleve-Tylenol and Advil-Tylenol is striking for being
in the opposite direction. For example, Aleve takes $5.75 to negate a marginal Tylenol attack
on it, whereas Tylenol needs $3.50 to negate a marginal Aleve attack. These di¤erences are
explained by the fact that the main component of damage is the pull e¤ect, given by (14)
as sk
sj
(1 )
djk
. Di¤erences in diversion ratios and market shares across pairs then explain the
results. Because the diversion ratios from Tylenol to other brands are systematically smaller
than in the opposite direction, the marginal e¤ect of Tylenol attacks is larger on Advil and
Aleve, whose shares are quite similar. However, the much smaller Bayer share reverses this.
Other brands are a¤ected when brand j attacks brand k. First, the push-up e¤ect on
brand j hurts all other brands l 6= j, and the pull-down e¤ect on brand k benets all other
brands l 6= k. The net e¤ect (see (15) above) can a priori be positive or negative. For
all our specications, we nd non-negligible, positive and statistically signicant spillovers
for all but one case (Bayers attacks on Advil). These range from 12 to 52 cents for each
dollar spent on a marginal attack, except for the outlier case of Excedrin on Tylenol, where
Excedrin does very little comparative advertising and the estimates are unreliable due to the
small number of observations of this target pair. Notice that the imprecise estimates in Table
5 feed through into imprecision in Table 7 (for example, Bayer vs. Advil). However, except
for the outlier case of Excedrin against Tylenol, the intervals are smaller than those in Table
6. This is because the expression for spillover damage, (15), is written in terms of ratios
of diversion ratios, whereas the damage to the target, (14), encompasses the reciprocal of
a diversion ratio: small estimates of diversion ratios therefore give large damages and large
condence intervals.
Even though the results of Table 6 indicate much stronger pull-down e¤ects on the target
than push-up e¤ects, the pull-down e¤ect only benets rivals to the extent that demand
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shed by the target is diverted to them.34 But rivals are also harm by the attackers push-up
component of comparative advertising. Nonetheless, our results in Table 7 indicate that
the net e¤ect on other brands is positive. The positive spillovers on other brands are quite
substantial. For example, a marginal comparative advertising dollar spent by Advil against
Aleve benets Motrin by 40 cents and Tylenol by 52 cents, while beneting Advil by $1,
and hurting Aleve by $7.87 (from Table 6). We are unable to estimate the spillovers on the
other brands because we are unable to estimate the diversion ratios from those other brands
to both target and attacker (Excedrin attacks neither, while Bayer does not attack Aleve).
Indeed, estimating the spillover on l when j targets k requires estimates of the diversion
ratios djk, dlk, and dlj. In turn, this requires there to be active attacks from j to k and l,
and from l to k. Hence we cannot estimate any spillovers from Motrin attacks because no
brand attacks Motrin in return.
TABLE 7. Spillover E¤ects
Attacker Attacked Advil Bayer Motrin Tylenol
Advil Aleve 0:404
[0:188;0:686]
0:517
[0:266;0:863]
Advil Tylenol 0:120
[0:054;0:155]
Aleve Tylenol 0:387
[0:230;0:485]
Bayer Advil 0:172
[ 0:036;0:432]
Excedrin Tylenol 1:648
[0:560;13:916]
Tylenol Advil 0:484
[0:214;1:325]
Tylenol Aleve 0:202
[0:052;0:304]
A row-column entry gives the dollar e¤ect on the column brand of a $1
increment in comparative advertising on the row link. Bootstrapped 90%
condence intervals are in square brackets below the point estimates.
Condence intervals are based on 100 draws on the asymptotic distribution
of the estimates from Column 6 of Table 4 and from Column 1 of Table 5.
The estimates of spillovers indicate signicant free-rider e¤ects in comparative advertis-
ing, insofar as other brands are shown to benet from comparative advertising (the harm
34This dilution of pull-down is already reected in the attackers calculus: it only gets a fraction of the
demand lost by its target.
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from the push e¤ect is dominated by the gains from the pull e¤ect on the target). Lest this
suggest that comparative advertising is insu¢ cient (which it is if we exclude the target!),
bear in mind that the costs to the target far outweigh the sum of benets to attacker and
other rivals. For example, a marginal dollar spent by Advil attacking Tylenol causes a $3.22
loss to Tylenol (Table 6) and a 12 cent gain to Bayer (Table 7), and a $1 benet to Advil.
The practice of comparative advertising causes far more loss in prot to the target (at the
margin) than it recoups to the attacker and spills over to other rivals. This, quite likely,
explains why there are so few industries (in so few countries) where comparative advertising
is used. Recognizing the mutual harm, companies refrain from attacks.35
6 Conclusions
The paper models comparative advertising as having both a push upe¤ect on own per-
ceived quality, and a pull-downe¤ect on a targeted rivals quality. The targeting of com-
parative advertising a¤ords a unique opportunity for estimating diversion ratios between
products solely from observed supply side comparative advertising expenditures. Diversion
ratios are direct inputs into deriving estimates for the damage inicted from comparative
advertising and the spillover to other brands.
The empirical results for OTC analgesics indicate that push-up from a marginal compar-
ative ad is about half then push-up from a marginal self-promotion ad. The benet from
pull-down is much smaller than the damage to the target, while conferring signicant net
benets on other rivals. On net though, comparative advertising causes more harm to in-
dustry prot than benet (and similar complaints are voiced about the destructive damage
caused by negative political campaign ads). This is a likely reason why it remains quite
rare.36
The e¤ects of advertising in the Push-Pull set-up are channeled through quality di¤er-
35As discussed further in the conclusions, other ways of conceptualizing comparative advertising might
soften this conclusion.
36Comparative advertising is being used recently more and more of late (e.g., the soup-wars between
Campbells and Progresso), coinciding with a recession, when quasi-collusion typically has more trouble
surviving.
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ences. This gives quite a negative view of comparative ads, in the sense that there is much
wasteful battling to and fro between brands just to stay aoat. This feature is reminiscent
of the critique of advertising that it serves solely to reshu­ e demand and brands are better
o¤ if they could agree not to do it (they would save the expense). The critique is a fortiori
true of comparative advertising.
Our conclusions from the push-pull set-up may also be consistent with alternative ways
of thinking of how comparative advertising works. Indeed, when consumers have di¤erent
tastes over di¤erent characteristics, then comparative advertising (done by di¤erent brands
about di¤erent characteristics) can convey information to consumers. However, it should
then be expected that comparative advertising contains information that the target would
choose not to include in its own ads. It would then incur a loss in prot that could outweigh
the benets to other parties. Anderson and Renault (2009) show in such a setting that this
theoretically possible. They nd that comparative advertising, when it is used in equilibrium,
may induce the target to decrease its price and the losses thus inicted may be large enough
to outweigh the benets to the attacker and to consumers, so social surplus decreases. Even
if such a detrimental welfare outcome does not arise, an informative advertising approach
yields the same potential ambiguity as the push-pull set-up with regard to the desirability
of comparative advertising for industry prot. One fruitful avenue for future research into
comparative advertising is to estimate structural parameters for alternative formulations of
how such advertising a¤ects consumer choices.
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